Introduction
This paper examines the long-run effects of job displacement in Sweden on family income and on potential income replacement by increased spousal earnings and welfare state transfers. Several studies, during the last two decades, have shown that the earnings losses from job loss are not only temporary but last for many years (Ruhm, 1991; Jacobson et al., 1993; Stevens, 1997; Couch, 2001; Eliason & Storrie, 2006) . That job loss seems to lower earnings persistently raises the question whether displaced workers are compensated by other means. One possible source of income replacement, for couples, is that the spouse enters the labour market or if already working increases the number of working hours (i.e., an "added worker effect").
Previous empirical literature on the added-worker effect (e.g., Lundberg, 1985; Maloney, 1987 Maloney, , 1991 Seitchik, 1991; Cullen & Gruber, 2000; Prieto-Rodríguez & Rodríguez-Gutiérrez, 2000; Nilsson, 2008) has shown that this possible source of income replacement within the family does not seem to be utilized to any larger extent or that the spouse face such employment constraints that this is not a viable option.
1 F o r P e e r R e v i e w 3 earning than they otherwise would have had. There are other compensation schemes, however, for workers temporarily, or permanently, out of employment, such as disability and sickness insurance, and means-tested social benefits.
Relatively little is known about the impact of job displacement on a household"s economic well-being apart from the impact on the displaced workers" own earnings or wages. Even though studies focusing on wages, or earnings, have had a central role in the displaced worker literature, family income may in many respects be a better measure of economic welfare (Björklund & Palme, 2000; Seitchik, 1991) . Two US studies have previously investigated the impact on family income. Stephens (2001) showed that total family income was less volatile than the head"s earnings following job displacement and that focusing on individual income or earnings will overestimate the overall impact on economic wellbeing. Seitchik (1991) found that both increased spousal earnings and government transfers replaced some of the displaced husband"s earnings, but that the replacement rate on average was rather small.
The current study differs from previous work in several respects. It focuses solely on job displacement due to plant (i.e., establishment) closure. A plant closure can be viewed, at least to some extent, as a natural experiment as all workers are laid off irrespective of their characteristics. Thus, one is more likely to estimate causal effects of job loss not contaminated by selection bias. I will also explicitly investigate the impact of husbands" job displacement not only on family income but on several potential sources of income replacement: increased earnings by the wife;
both spouses" utilization of unemployment insurance, sickness insurance, and disability insurance, as well as family means-tested social assistance. Moreover, a
Swedish longitudinal data set is used and as Sweden has been pointed to as an (Esping-Andersen, 1990 ) this may produce different findings from those in, for example, the US. Moreover, the high female labour force participation in Sweden, and that both spouses are expected to be self-supportive within marriage, may suggest that the labour supply of married women in Sweden is even less responsive than elsewhere to changes in their husband"s earnings.
The Swedish labour market and social security system
During the period under study, dramatic changes took place in the state of the Swedish labour market, which needs to be borne in mind when interpreting the results. Below, I will give a very brief description of the Swedish labour market and of each of the income compensation schemes.
The Swedish labour market 2
In 1987 when the job losses occurred, Sweden was in a period of remarkably low unemployment. The unemployment rate had been falling since 1983 and in 1989 it was down at 1.5 percent, while the employment rate, during the same period, rose continually from 79.0 to 82.9 percent. During the years that followed, Sweden experienced the most severe recession since the 1930s. The unemployment rate rose to 8.2 percent in 1993 and stayed about this level until 1997, and the employment rate fell by more than ten percentage points to 72.6 percent. Thus, the displaced workers faced a very buoyant labour market at the time of the job loss, with good opportunities to find new jobs quickly, before they had to face the impending recession.
2 See Holmlund (2003) for more details. Sweden is also internationally recognized for its high degree of women in the labour force. During these years, the labour force participation was almost as high for women as for men and in 1990 it peaked at 82.3 percent after rising for decades. The increase was then halted by the economic crisis and subsequently fell to 73.9 percent in 1998. Similarly, the female employment rate fell from 81.0 percent in 1990 to 69.4 percent in 1998. Although there were only small differences between the employment rates of men and women, it should be noted that the employed women were mainly working part time.
The Swedish social security system 3
The social security system in Sweden aims at providing universal financial security and its structure is potentially of significant importance for both the labour supply response of married women to their husbands" job loss, or unemployment, and the real economic losses for families experiencing job loss. The social security system offers four income sources of particular interest for displaced workers in working ages: unemployment insurance, sickness insurance, disability insurance, and meanstested social assistance.
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Unemployment insurance is, of course, the key welfare state transfer for job losers of working age. It will not only reduce income losses during periods of unemployment, but it may also reduce the longer-term impact of job loss by allowing for extended job search resulting in better-quality matches. Payment of unemployment insurance is conditional on registration with the public employment 3 See Bergmark and Palme (2003) or Sjögren Lindquist and Wadensjö (2006) for a more thorough description of the development and details of the Swedish social security system. 4 Unemployment insurance is actually not a part of the social insurance system in Sweden but comes under labour market policy. service and the recipient must be available for work and actively seek job.
Entitlement is also associated with a work condition. Those not qualified for unemployment insurance could be granted unemployment assistance instead. During the time period covered here the unemployment insurance system was changed several times and the benefit level varied between 80 and 90 percent of previous earnings up to a ceiling.
Considering the massive literature showing an association between job loss (unemployment) and ill health, 5 sickness and disability insurance may also be important sources of income amongst displaced workers. Sickness insurance is payable in cases of temporary illness that reduces working capacity. Just like the unemployment insurance, it replaces a share of lost earnings up to a ceiling and for most of the period the replacement ratio was the same as for the unemployment insurance, whereas the ceiling has consistently been higher.
In case of a more permanently reduced working capacity, a person could be eligible for disability insurance. However, until 1991 persons aged at least 60 years could also be granted disability insurance for labour market reasons only and until 1997 for a combination of health and labour market reasons. Thereafter, only medical reasons for the reduced working capacity should be considered. The income ceiling for disability insurance has been the same as for sickness insurance, but the replacement rate has been lower.
Finally, means-tested social assistance will be the ultimate safety net for those otherwise unable to make a living. It is means-tested on a household basis and is supposed to guarantee a "reasonable standard of living." To be entitled to social 5 See Kasl and Jones (2000) for a review. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   7 assistance, one should be unable to make a living on not only work, unemployment insurance, and other benefits, but also on assets.
In addition to the social security schemes mentioned above, there are a number of supplementary schemes for unemployed workers. Initially, displaced workers have a stipulated right to a paid wage for a certain period after given notice. This is also the case if the business close down; then any wages not paid by the firm are covered by a state wage guarantee. There are also a number of security agreements between employer organisations and trade union organisations entitling redundant workers to severance pay. The trade union organisations also provide both collective and individual unemployment insurance compensating for forgone income above the ceiling in the unemployment insurance scheme. A majority of all workers are covered by these collective agreements and similar insurance schemes also exist in the case of sickness and disability.
None of the supplementary schemes will be explicitly included in the following analysis due to the difficulty to identify such payments in the data. Unfortunately, some of them will be implicitly included, since according to Statistics Sweden at least some of the supplementary unemployment insurances will show up as earnings in the administrative registers. Hence, estimates of the earnings losses from job loss are likely to be underestimated and any estimates of the income replacement from social security should be interpreted as the part replaced by the public social security system alone. Register) were merged to obtain information on these couples for four predisplacement years (i.e., 1983-1986 ) and 13 post-displacement years (i.e., 1987-1999) .
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The samples of married couples were constructed in four steps. First, all closing establishments with at least 10 employees were identified by the disappearance of their identity number from the administrative registers. The problem with "false firm deaths" (i.e., that the disappearance of the identity number is instead due to, for example, a change of owner) emphasized in Kuhn (2002) was eliminated by Statistics Sweden by also surveying the firm.
In a second step, the workers corresponding to these establishments were identified by linking individual data to establishment data. 7 A worker was defined as 6 Income taxation and the administration of the universal Swedish welfare state provide the source for many of the variables in these registers. The employer files all wage payments to the tax authorities and, as practically all transfers in the Swedish welfare state, such as disability insurance, and sickness and unemployment benefits, are liable to tax the National Social Insurance Board also files income statements on such transfers (together with non-taxable social assistance payments).
7 Registers can be merged and one can link employees to their establishments since every resident and every establishment in Sweden has a unique identity number (i.e., a civic registration number or an In a fourth step, all married male workers were linked to their spouse. This was possible since there is joint taxation of wealth for married couples in Sweden and Statistics Sweden collects the administrative records from the National Tax Board.
The same information could therefore be attained for both spouses.
organization number) and that the obligatory income statements filed to the taxation authorities by the employer, contain both these numbers. 8 This ensures that all displaced workers were employed at the same point in time as the workers in the comparison group and implies that for closures in 1987, only those who were displaced in the closing year were included in the sample and for closures in 1988, only those displaced during the calendar year before final closure given that the closing process was deemed longer than a year. The length of each individual closing process was determined ad hoc based on establishment size and worker flows during the three years preceding the closure. Most of the closing processes, however, were considered less than a calendar year. Finally, I constrained the sample to couples were both spouses were of age 25-51 yrs in the end of 1986, had non-missing information for all baseline variables, and had been married during the four baseline years. The age restriction ensures that both spouses were of working age during the full follow-up period, while the latter restriction ensures that the baseline variables correspond to the two spouses as a married couple. After applying these restrictions 1,122 displaced and 29,934 nondisplaced couples remained.
Method
The focus on displacements due to plant closures only, is likely to reduce any selection problems. One can argue that an establishment closure is close to a natural experiment as all workers are separated from their jobs irrespective of their individual characteristics and behaviour. Nonetheless, there will be differences between displaced and non-displaced workers, since closures are not randomly distributed over the economy. 9 In the displaced worker literature (e.g., Jacobson et al. 1993; Margolis, 1999; Huttunen et al., 2006) , a fixed-effect regression model including both lagged and leading dummy variables of the incidence of job displacement, have become standard when examining wage and earnings effects of job displacement. This model exploits the panel dimension of the data in that it control for unobserved time-invariant variables and allows the impact of job loss to set in even before the actual job loss and to be long lasting. Here, I will combine the 9 See Falck (2007) for an empirical study of the impact of regional conditions on firm survival. fixed-effect estimator with propensity score and inverse-probability-of-censoring weighting.
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By propensity score weighting, one will ideally obtain a pseudo-sample where the distribution of observed characteristics is the same in the sample of displaced and non-displaced couples. The propensity score (p D ) is the probability of treatment (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) , i.e., displacement, which is usually not known but has to be estimated; here by a logit model:
, where D i,baseline is an indicator taking the value 1 if worker i was displaced at baseline and 0 otherwise, and X baseline is a vector of baseline covariates. To estimate the effect on those actually displaced, couple i is then assigned a weight
Hence, all displaced couples are assigned a weight equal to one, while each non-displaced couple j is assigned a weight equal to / (1 ) DD jj pp .
As Charles and Stephens (2004) recognizes, a study which focuses on couples who remain married for the whole study period is likely to underestimate true family adjustment due to job loss, as couples who remain married are likely to be those who had to make the least adjustment to the job loss. 12 To adjust for this I will adopt an additional, but similar weighting strategy, i.e., inverse-probability-of-censoringweighting, proposed by Robins and Rotnitzky (1995) . While the job loss is viewed as 10 See Hirano and Imbens (2001) for their suggested propensity score weighted regression and Robins and Rotnitzky (1995) for their inverse-probability-of-censoring weighted estimator.
11 See Hirano and Imbens (2001) .
12 Divorce is not the only reason for a couple to be censored; marriages also dissolve upon the death of a spouse, and even though migration of one or both spouses does not necessarily mean that the marriage is dissolved they are no longer observed in the data. DI indicates time relative to baseline displacement (i.e., it is equal one if baseline displacement occurred k years prior to year t). The inverse-probability-of-censoring weights can then be defined as
The derived propensity score and censoring weights can then be used to construct the final weights as ,, 
Choice of conditioning variables
The baseline variables included in the estimation of the probability of job loss and of the probability of being censored were the same. Included were both spouses" age (third order); indicators of being foreign born, attained education (8 categories), and industry sector (10 categories); indicators of non-zero income, and the amounts, from employment (incl. self-employment), unemployment insurance, sickness insurance, and disability insurance; number of children aged 0-6 yrs and 7-17 yrs; county of residence (21 counties); and the couples incidence and total amount of taxable wealth and means-tested social assistance. The estimation of the probability of being censored included time-varying measures of county of residence and all income measures except for taxable wealth, which were not available for all years, while the estimation of the outcome equation only included county of residence and the spouses ages (third order).
Descriptive statistics and balancing test
Before examining the results, we will assess the degree of covariate balance. To compare comparable people, has been shown to be important in reducing selection bias in evaluation studies (Heckman et al., 1999) . To investigate whether comparable samples have been obtained with respect to the baseline covariates, the differences in terms of standardized differences in means (SDM) were calculated for each single baseline (Table A2 ). 14 15 The most pronounced pre-displacement differences between 14 Various other balancing tests have been suggested in the literature (Smith & Todd, 2005) , but there is no consensus on which of them to apply. 15 The standardized difference in means is the difference in covariate means between the displaced couples and the weighted non-displaced couples, in percentage of the pooled standard deviation (before weighting) of that covariate. the two un-weighted samples correspond to differences in economic sector where the husbands were employed. As can be expected, a much smaller share of the displaced men were employed in community, social, and personal services, containing much of the public sector, while they to a larger extent were employed in the construction sector and financial intermediation, real estate, renting, or business activities. Other pronounced differences are lower earnings, and more experiences of unemployment among the displaced husbands.
The average of the absolute values of the SDMs before the propensity score weighting was 6.99, while after weighting it decreased considerably to 0.36. The largest absolute value of SDM for a single covariate decreased from 38.75 to 1.80.
As an absolute value of 20 was considered substantial in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) , while less than 10 was considered small in Normand, Landrum, Guadagnoli, Ayanian, Ryan, Cleary et al. (2001), this would suggest that the two samples were not that disparate even before the propensity score weighting, but that weighting the non-displaced couples, nonetheless, considerable reduced any imbalances.
Results

The impact of husbands' job loss on both spouses earnings
A natural point of departure would be to first make a convincing case that the job losses produced a shock to earnings of married men. in the displacement year corresponding to 9,325 SEK (4.1 %) and it dropped even further to more than 13,000 SEK (5.6 %) in the following year. 16 Although the negative impact seems to have diminished somewhat in the next year, this recovery was only temporary. During the last nine years, the annual losses were more than 14,000 SEK (6.2 %). The larger long-run effects might be explained by the severe recession, in the early 1990s, during which it has been argued that displaced workers were more likely to once again lose their jobs (Eliason and Storrie, 2006) .
17
After having established that job loss inflicted rather large and persistent losses in married men"s earnings we proceed to the main part of the paper investigating whether these losses were replaced by other means. One possibility would be that the wife either entered the labour market or if already working increased hours of work (i.e., an added worker effect) to compensate the reduction in family income arising from the husband"s job loss. Although wives" hours of work are not observed in the data their annual earnings are. Changes in annual earnings may only approximately correspond to changes in labour supply, but analyzing earnings data can answer the perhaps more important question whether the wives were able to replace the losses inflicted on their husbands" earnings.
>>TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE<<
The earnings estimates for the wives are for most years statistically non-significant and in the initial years around the husband"s job loss the estimates are also very close to zero. From the second post-displacement year and onwards the earnings of wives 16 The presented relative effects are calculated by dividing the estimate by the difference between the weighted mean for the displaced workers and the same estimate.
17 Stevens (1997) also showed that the main cause of the long-term effects of job loss on earnings was attributable to higher risks of subsequent job losses. earnings, opportunities at the expense of the wife"s earnings. One potential such adjustment would be that they moved to maximize the husband"s earnings potential and the wife, as the secondary earner, would then be considered a tied mover.
Displaced couples' utilization of the social security system
As the earnings losses that married men suffered from job loss, do not seem to have been replaced by increased labour supply of the wife one can then ask whether the couples instead were able to offset these losses by making use of the public social security system. In the following, I will present the results from investigating the impact of husband"s job loss on the couples" utilization of four kinds of social security: unemployment insurance, sickness insurance, disability insurance, and means-tested social benefits. Although the Swedish public social security system encompasses also other benefits, those have to be regarded less important for couples in working age. However, the supplementary insurance schemes briefly mentioned above have recently been pointed to as important elements in the Swedish welfare state (Sjögren Lindquist & Wadensjö, 2006) .
Starting with the utilization of unemployment insurance (Table 2) , there was a large increase in the received amount of unemployment insurance by the husband in the year of the job loss. In monetary terms, it corresponds to about 6,400 SEK (428.8 however, there was a sharp decrease in the utilization of unemployment insurance, which ceased abruptly in the following year and then even reversed. The longer run impact corresponds to roughly a 4,700 SEK (60.5 %) increase in annually received unemployment insurance. Although it is possible that husbands" unemployment insurance crowded-out any immediate added-worker effect, this is an unlikely explanation of the lack of adjustment of wives" labour supply in the longer run.
Moreover, neither the lack of response in wives" labour supply (i.e., annual earnings) during the first years nor the following decrease in earnings can be explained by higher utilization of unemployment insurance amongst the wives.
>>TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE<<
A significant number of studies have found an association between job loss and ill health. Not only may the loss of a job be stressful because of long-lasting earnings losses but it may also entail the loss of social networks and time structure, threatened self-esteem and self-confidence, and possibly altered family relations and increased family tensions. Some of the distress associated to job loss has been shown to extend also to other family members. 18 Thus, it seems natural to investigate whether increased sickness or disability can be a partial explanation of either married men"s long-lasting earnings losses or wives" lack of adjustment. As can be seen in the left columns of Table 3 and 4, there was no immediate impact of job loss on husbands" own utilization of either sickness or disability insurance. This is the expected result when it comes to disability pension, but if one believes that job loss has adverse health effects, one should perhaps have expected increased sickness. This does not necessarily mean that job loss did not adversely affect health, as those unemployed 18 For a review, see Jones (1992) have been a possibility for some of the workers here. Thus, any increased utilization of disability pension cannot be viewed in terms of deterioration in health only but also in terms of sustained labour market difficulties. 19 The impact on wives" utilization of sickness and disability insurance was only minor and in no case statistically significant.
>>TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE<< >>TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE<<
The final type of social security investigated here is also the ultimate safety net for the unemployed. Although the overall utilization of means-tested social assistance increased dramatically in Sweden during the 1990s, one would not expect this source of income to be dominating in a sample of workers who all have previously been employed and so insured. It is, nonetheless, interesting to examine to what extent job loss increased the utilization of means-tested social assistance, since receiving it can be viewed as an indicator of officially recognized economic hardship (Stenberg, 1998). 20 However, the estimates reveal only a minor, and statistically non-significant, impact of husband"s job loss on the couple's utilization of means-tested social 19 For the Netherlands it has been found that approximately one quarter of the disability insurance enrolment was hidden unemployment (Koning & van Vuuren, 2007) . 20 Since the shame or social stigma associated to receiving means-tested social assistance implies that not all of those who are poor enough to be eligible actually apply, any measure based on receiving social assistance is likely to underestimate the true degree of economic hardship (Stenberg, 1998) . (Table 5) . Thus, albeit the previous results have indicated that displaced married men suffered long-lasting earnings losses it seems that job displacements in Sweden, and at this time, did not lead to widespread severe economic hardship for the displaced workers or their families.
>>TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE<<
Finally, I will summarize by showing, also in Table 5 (right), the impact of job loss on annual pre-tax family income. 21 Although the immediate loss of husbands" own earnings transmits to a large loss in family income, job loss seem to have long-lasting economic impact even when including wife"s income and income from unemployment, sickness, and disability insurance, and means-tested social benefits.
From the second post-displacement year and to the end of the observation period, eleven years later, the loss in family income before taxes were more than 9,600 SEK (2.5 %) each year.
Robustness checks and the impact of censoring
As a check of robustness of the results to the choice of estimator, the fixed-effect regressions were re-estimated without applying the propensity score and inverseprobability-of-censoring weights. I argued in Section 3, that not taking censoring into account may produce biased estimates, as censoring occurs by the dissolution of the couple (either by divorce, death, or migration) and one would expect these couples to 21 The measure of family income is not equivalent to total disposable family income but is the before tax sum of both spouses" earnings and the transfers investigated here. As stated above the exclusion of any supplementary benefits are likely to overestimate any adverse impact although diminished by the fact that some of these benefits show up as earnings in the data. The use of family income before taxes, on the other hand, will probably overestimate the same effects to some extent as the progressive income tax is likely to offset some of the differences. be the ones to have required the most adjustments to the job loss. However, the estimates obtained then not applying the inverse-probability-of-censoring weights (Table A2) are very close to those presented earlier. Table A3 shows the corresponding estimates when the fixed effect estimator is applied without both inverse-probability-of-censoring weights and propensity score weights. These estimates differ somewhat more and then especially the long-run estimates. In comparison, the estimates presented in the main analysis are in most cases the more conservative, while the unweighted estimates suggest that there are statistically significant long-run effects of job loss on both husbands" and wives" earnings, family income, as well as husbands" utilization of all three insurances.
Summary and discussion
This paper has explored to which extent married men"s earnings losses, following involuntary job loss, were replaced by either increased earnings by the wife or by transfers from the public social security system. The empirical evidence on these matters is sparse, although a vast literature establishes long-lasting earnings losses following job loss.
Job displacement among the married men in this study seems to have inflicted substantial long-run earnings losses. This would suggest incentives for increased labour supply by the wife to offset these losses. However, no such adjustment is evident. If anything, the wives of the displaced men experience on average lower earnings. A number of explanations have been suggested, in the literature to why an added worker effect have not been established empirically, such as disincentives from means-tested social insurances, both spouses are more likely to lose their job due to assortative mating, shared restrictions stemming from common labour market (Doris, 1999; Prieto-Rodríguez & Rodríguez-Gutiérrez, 2000) . Most of these explanations, however, can be ruled out here. Unemployment insurance is not given on family basis in Sweden and neither did government transfers replace a major part of husbands" long-run earnings losses. The exclusive focus on job displacements due to establishment closure should reasonably exclude also assortative mating as a plausible explanation. A potential explanation, not explicitly mentioned in the literature on the added worker effect, is that job loss may affects wives" health, and especially mental health, which could adversely affect her productivity and work absenteeism. Although the possibility that such a mechanism was at work cannot be rejected, it is not supported by an increase in wives" sickness insurance.
To conclude, neither do wives" labour supply work as insurance for long-lasting earnings losses following married men"s job displacement nor does the social security system offset the major part of these losses; the long-run losses in family income amount to almost 10,000 SEK. As the impact on individual earnings (the measure most frequently used in previous studies) does not necessarily reflect the real economic impact on the individual, this adds to the current knowledge on the individual and family welfare costs of worker displacement. Moreover, married men"s job loss did not only increase their utilization of unemployment insurance but there is also an indication of an increased utilization of disability insurance in the long run. Although many studies have shown adverse health effects from involuntary job loss, the increased utilization of disability insurance does not necessarily confirm such negative health effects as disability insurance was granted also for labour market reasons. No increase in utilization of social assistance was found, however, which would suggest that job loss in Sweden during these years did not cause widespread severe economic hardship at least. However, as displaced workers lose their jobs not by fault, or behaviour, but due to economic, and structural, change beneficial to the economy overall, the failure of both the family and the welfare state to replace their lost earning suggests that displaced workers and their families bear the costs of increased welfare for all. 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
